Organizational Differences between U.S. Major Leagues and European Leagues: Implications for Salary Caps by Helmut Dietl et al.
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 11-05 
   




   Organizational Differences between U.S. Major Leagues and 













  Abstract 
  This paper outlines and compares the organizational structure of major sports leagues, 
explores the reasoning behind their formation, and derives implications for salary caps in 
European football. To understand why sports leagues have developed a specific organizational 
structure, one must take the economic peculiarities of team sports leagues into consideration. For 
this purpose, we analyze the production process and illuminate its major peculiarities. For 
example, we present the difference between economic competition and competition on the pitch 
and discuss the consequences of this distinction for an attractive final product. Furthermore, we 
show that a hold-up problem exists between the two stages of the production process and 
demonstrate how these problems are overcome by the organizational structure chosen by sports 
leagues. We also outline the differences between the U.S. major leagues and European leagues 
and document recent developments in that context. Finally, based on this comparative 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline and compare the organizational structure of major 
sports  leagues,  explore  the  reasoning  behind  their  formation,  and  derive  implications  for 
salary caps in European football. To understand why sports leagues have developed a specific 
organizational structure, we must take the economic peculiarities of team sports leagues into 
consideration. For this purpose, we analyze the production process and illuminate its major 
peculiarities.  For  example,  we  present  the  difference  between  economic  competition  and 
competition on the pitch and discuss the consequences of this distinction for an attractive final 
product. Furthermore, we show that a hold-up problem exists between the two stages of the 
production process and demonstrate how these problems are overcome by the organizational 
structure chosen by sports leagues. We also outline the differences between the U.S. major 
leagues and European leagues and document recent developments in that context. Finally, 
based on this comparative institutional analysis, we derive implications for the introduction of 
salary caps into European football. 
2. Organizational Structure of Sports Leagues
1 
2.1 Two-Stage Production Process 
To understand why major sports leagues have developed a specific organizational structure, it 
is first necessary to analyze the production process. Professional sports clubs mainly derive 
their  revenues  from  five  sources.  Match-day  revenue  and  broadcasting  rights  combined 
account  for  one-half  to  three-fourths  of  total  league  revenue,  and  the  rest  comprises 
merchandizing,  advertising  and  sponsoring  revenue  (Deloitte,  2004).  At  first  glance,  any 
single game and the attention generated by it seem relevant for match-day and broadcasting 
revenue.  However,  when  comparing  revenues  from  exhibition  games  to  those  from 
championship games, one begins to see that the value of the latter significantly exceeds that of 
the  former.  The  value  of  any  game  depends  on  the  strength  of  the  participating  teams. 
However, the relevance of the game for the championship contributes more significantly to 
the game’s value. 
Seen from this viewpoint, value creation in professional team sports occurs in two distinct 
stages. In the first stage, at the level of individual clubs, club owners invest in developing the 
playing strength of their respective teams. The problem, however, is that no single team is 
able to produce a marketable product. To do so, a team needs at least one opponent. The value 
of the resulting games can then be increased significantly if those games are integrated into a 
                                                 
1 This section is based on Franck (2003) and Dietl, Franck, Hasan, and Lang (2009).   3 
championship race. Thus, in the second stage of the production process, the league stage, 
single games act as inputs for the production of the final meta-product, the championship 
itself.
2 
2.2 Economic vs. Sportive Competition 
This multi-stage production process is characterized by some economic peculiarities. First, a 
distinction must be made between economic competition and competition on the field. In 
sports, any team will try to dominate its opponents and maximize its percentage of wins. From 
a league-wide economic perspective, however, the attractiveness of the championship might 
be increasing in the balance of the competition (competitive balance). Thus, on aggregate, the 
absence  of  single  teams  dominating  the  championship  is  economically  preferable.  This 
phenomenon exists in stark contrast to the notion of economic competition, where the goal of 
any competitor is to attain monopoly status to maximize profits. 
With regard to competition in sports, scholars such as Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964) 
recognized early on that an on-pitch monopoly on the part of any single team would lower the 
team's profits as the championship became unattractive and demand subsequently decreased. 
According to the so-called “uncertainty of outcome hypothesis,” fans prefer to attend games 
with an uncertain outcome and enjoy close championship races.
3 Thus, to produce a valuable 
product,  it  is  necessary  for  a  team  to  have  powerful  rivals  and  belong  to  a  league  that 
coordinates championships.  
2.3 League Monopoly, Hold-Up Problem and Vertical Integration 
Another peculiarity of professional sports production is that, by definition, any championship 
must  possess  monopoly  status.  The  validity  of  a  championship  rests  primarily  on  such 
monopoly status. If there are several championships per market area and sport, no consistent 
ranking of all performers is achieved and, hence, the championship will lose a significant part 
of its value for consumers. A brief look at the history of major league sports shows that the 
periods of inter-league competition have been rather short and, in cases when a contender has 
succeeded at all in seriously challenging the established league, have ended in mergers (Quirk 
and Fort, 1992). In European soccer, this uniqueness of national championships is additionally 
                                                 
2 In some leagues, such as the European soccer leagues, there exists a third stage in which the product of the 
second stage, the national champions, becomes input for a higher-order championship: the UEFA Champions 
League.  Fort  (2003)  argues  that  this  is  similar  to  MLB  (NFL),  where  the  American  and  National  League 
(Conference) are also separate entities overseen by the MLB (NFL), each crowning an overall champion. 
3 See Downward and Dawson (2000), Borland and MacDonald (2003), and Szymanski (2003) and Lenten (2008, 
2009) for contributions that analyze the relation between competitive balance and match attendance.   4 
enforced on a formal basis by the European Football Association (UEFA)'s lack of approval 
for any national league not licensed by its respective national soccer federation. 
The  compulsory  monopoly  status  of  major  leagues  has  important  implications  for  the 
participating clubs. The investments of club owners in their teams are specific in the sense 
that they cannot be transferred to alternative, equally profitable endeavors. No individual club 
owner has an economically viable option for exit from a monopolistic major league other than 
shutting down and selling the team. Therefore, whenever clubs and the league coordinate their 
relationships via contracts, a hold-up risk arises (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). Having 
made investments in their teams, club owners cannot redirect their investments into other 
businesses without losing a significant part of their value, and they are thus forced to accept 
whichever conditions the league’s governing body offers.  
Therefore, a solution is required that preserves monopolistic league status and, at the same 
time, safeguards specific investments in team development. Vertical integration between the 
two levels of production is the standard governance prescription when specific investments 
are involved (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979). 
If the league were organized as a classical firm, both relevant steps of the value chain 
would occur under unified ownership. In such a setting, the hold-up risk loses its relevance 
because it is the league owner who invests in the development of his different subsidiary 
teams. However, the classical firm as a form of vertical integration between the two steps in 
the value chain cannot serve as a role model for major league sports because this is in conflict 
with the requirement of securing the integrity of the championship race.
4 
Therefore,  an  alternative  form  of  vertical  integration  is  required,  namely,  one  that 
preserves individual incentives to compete. From a value chain perspective, this alternative 
can be described as a form of forward integration from the level of team-development into 
championship  production,  whereas  the  introduction  of  a  league  owner  can  be  seen  as 
backward integration from the level of championship production into team development. 
 
                                                 
4 Major League Soccer (MLS) employs a firm-like structure with pooled ownership discussed as a manifestation 
of the "single entity league" model in the literature (Abbott, 2001). For example, the league owns all of the 
players' contracts in this structure and controls the allocation of players within the league. This allows for the 
centralized allocation of talent (and other resources), which limits bidding opportunities for player services and 
in the end leads to significant cost control benefits. However, none of the four genuine major leagues in North 
America and no European major leagues employ this concept. If a true and fair contest is a key element of the 
product sold in this industry, the cost control advantages of "single entity leagues" come at a high price. This 
(among many other things) may contribute to the fact that MLS is still minor as compared to European soccer or 
the other North American major leagues. 
   5 
2.4 Organizational Structure of U.S. Major Leagues and European Leagues 
The organizational structure suited to handling both of the problems discussed above is the 
cooperative association of team owners. It enables the required forward integration of every 
single  team  owner  into  championship  production  by  granting  him  representation  in  all 
relevant decisions at the league level. In the U.S. major leagues, all strategic questions of 
league-wide relevance are decided by majority voting. The only associates entitled to vote are 
the participating club owners. As a result, there is no room in this structure for a third party 
who is in control of the second level of production and who may hold up team owners. Every 
team owner is systematically compensated by "voice" for the lack of "exit" (Hirschman, 1970). 
At the same time, team owners retain their status as independent producers at the level of 
team development. This means that the individual incentives to compete in the championship 
remain stronger than they are within the boundaries of a single firm. Moreover, there is no 
room for a central league owner who might strategically plan outcomes. 
This institutional innovation was realized by the foundation of baseball’s National League 
in  1876  and  has  since  represented  the  single  most  robust  element  of  organization  in 
professional team sports. Other U.S. major leagues have quickly adopted this transformation 
as well.
5 
In contrast, European team sports leagues were historically run by their respective national 
and international associations, and they were legally independent from the professional clubs 
playing  in  these  leagues.  The  nature  of  the  relationship  was  best  described  as  one  of 
contractual governance between vertically separated entities. Under such circumstances of 
contractual governance, the league essentially acted as an intermediary for individual clubs' 
products.
6 In  the  last  few  years,  however,  European  soccer  leagues  have  adopted  a 
cooperative model and transformed into organizations that resemble their North American 
counterparts.
7 
In Germany, for example, in the year 2000, the 36 clubs in the first and second division of 
the German national soccer league (Bundesliga) founded the so-called "Ligaverband" (league 
association). The German soccer federation DFB (Deutscher Fußball-Bund) exclusively ceded 
                                                 
5 C.f. Szymanski and Ross (2007). 
6 Similar  situations  are  still  observed  in  individual  sports,  where  single  athletes  and  tournament  organizers 
negotiate contracts regulating the athletes' participation. Also, the Formula One (F1) motor racing league is an 
example of such a situation. The manufacturers that finance the racing teams and F1 management are by and 
large independent and regularly negotiate contract parameters, especially the distribution of rents. 
7 Based on a comparative institutional analysis, Dietl, Franck, Hasan, Lang (2009) explain the advantages of the 
cooperative form of league organization over contractual governance. They show how the forward integration of 
clubs into the stage of championship production increases league productivity relative to contractual interaction 
between clubs and the league.   6 
the rights to stage the Bundesliga championship to the league association. The latter then 
created the German soccer league DFL (Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH), of which the league 
association  is  the  sole  partner.  The  DFL  is  responsible  for  the  operations  of  the  league 
association  and  manages  the  implementation  of  its  decisions.  In  particular,  the  DFL 
supervises league play and markets the first and second division exclusively. Thus, until 2000, 
league operations in Germany were fully conducted by the soccer federation DFB, which is 
also  responsible  for  the  administration  of  amateur  and  women’s  soccer.  Only  from  2000 
onwards did professional soccer clubs begin to organize and market their championships with 
a high degree of independence from the national federation DFB. 
In  contrast  to  its  German  counterpart,  the  English  Premier  League  (officially  named 
Barclays Premier League) has had a somewhat longer tradition of independence from the 
English  Football  Association,  going  back  to  the  year  1992,  when  the  teams  of  the  first 
division  founded  the  "FA  Premier  League".  Today,  the  Premier  League  is  owned  by  20 
shareholders,  the  member  clubs.  Membership  is  dependent  on  sporting  performance,  and 
relegated clubs are required to transfer their ordinary share to the promoted clubs at the end of 
every  season.  Each  shareholder  is  entitled  to  one  vote,  and  all  rule  changes  and  major 
commercial contracts require the support of two thirds of the clubs voting at a general meeting. 
The French "Ligue de Football Professionnel" is the last step in a rather long chain of 
attempts to increase the independence of professional football from the Fédération Française 
de Football. The clubs’ first attempt to create their own organization employing professional 
players dates back to the year 1932, when an association called "l'Amicale des clubs amateurs 
utilisant des joueurs professionals" was registered. The Fédération repeatedly voted against 
secession, and the association therefore remained a hollow shell. Many stages of development 
("Groupement des clubs autorisés", the "Ligue nationale de football") had to take place before 
the creation of the " Ligue de Football Professionnel" in the last decade. The new organization 
is a registered association that includes all of the French clubs playing in the two top-flight 
competitions,  Ligue  1  and  Ligue  2,  which  are  comparable  to  their  German  counterpart 
Ligaverband. 
The  Italian  "Lega  Nazionale  Professionisti",  better  known  as  "Lega  Calcio",  and  the 
Spanish “Liga Nacional de Futbol Profesional", better known as "La Liga", are the result of 
similar attempts by professional football clubs to gain independence from their respective   7 
national  associations  and  take  over  the  governance  of  their  affairs.  Both  are  legally 
independent units, and both are cooperatives of the clubs playing in professional football.
8  
By  adopting  a  cooperative  form  of  governance  at  the  league  level,  the  professional 
European clubs thus followed a course of development that North American professional 
sports leagues had pioneered long ago. In contrast to their American counterparts, football 
leagues in Europe, however, are embedded in association structures. Every national football 
association governs a system of leagues that is open through promotion and relegation from 
the  amateur  level  to  the  top  national  division  of  professional  football.  At  the  top  of  the 
national  league  pyramid,  the  UEFA,  an  association  of  national  associations,  organizes 
European club competitions like the Champions League and the Europa League for the teams 
that meet certain criteria. 
The  championships  administered  by  these  supranational  organizations  have  a  rather 
contractual relationship with the clubs and therefore may induce the establishment of rent-
seeking endeavors, as with the G-14, a small fraction of European football clubs established 
as an interest group of 18 prominent clubs of European football. The UEFA has reacted to the 
G-14 by giving the clubs participating in European club competitions a say in the governance 
of the latter. In January 2008, the European Club Association (ECA) was formed. It consists 
of 103 members, with at least one from each of the 53 national associations, and has formal 
representation within the UEFA governance structure—for example, in providing half of the 
members of the UEFA Club Competitions Committee. The creation of the ECA was linked to 
the dissolution of the G-14. This development can also be interpreted as a move away from 
contractual governance towards a more cooperative form of league governance.  
Finally, another important difference between the U.S. major leagues and the European 
leagues is that, in many European countries, a majority of football clubs are still members' 
clubs in the classical sense. This implies that clubs in Europe focus on maximizing their 
winning percentage, while clubs in the U.S. work to maximize profits. Legally, clubs like FC 
Barcelona, Real Madrid, and FC Bayern München, all of them winners of the Champions 
League, are registered associations that are democratically governed by their members. In the 
absence of residual claimants, profit maximization as a club goal does not make sense. Even 
                                                 
8 Not only have the European soccer leagues moved in the North American direction, but also, the European 
basketball and handball leagues have done the same. Consider, e.g., the German basketball federation DBB 
(Deutscher  Basketball  Bund),  which  exclusively  ceded  the  rights  to  stage  the  Basketball  Bundesliga 
championship to the Basketball Bundesliga GmbH (BBL GmbH) in 1994. The equity holders of the BBL are the 
clubs playing in the championship (74% of shares) and the federation (26% of shares). In contrast, the Toyota 
German Handball Bundesliga was developed as a perfect blueprint of the German football institutions. After the 
clubs competing in the Bundesliga formed the cooperative association Ligaverband, the latter outsourced its day-
to-day operations to the HBL Handball-Bundesliga GmbH.   8 
in  the  case  of  English  football,  where  the  flagship  clubs  are  organized  as  firms,  the 
assumption  of  profit  maximization  at  the  club  level  seems  far-fetched  because  wealthy 
investors like Chelsea's Roman Abramovich have acted as sponsors in the past, spending 
rather than earning significant amounts of money. Consequently, in the sports economics 
literature, European clubs are treated as win maximizers and not as profit maximizers:   
"The most important difference between the USA and Europe is that American 
clubs are business-type companies seeking to make profits, whereas the only aim 
of most European clubs so far is to be successful on the field." (Késenne and 
Jeanrenaud, 1999).
9 
Recently, Garcia and Szymanski (2009) provided statistical evidence that the behavior of 
football clubs in the Spanish and English leagues is better approximated by win maximization 
(subject to zero profit budget constraints) than by profit maximization. 
In  the  next  section,  we  outline  the  consequences  of  the  association-governed  football 
pyramid for the introduction of salary caps into European football.  
3. Implications for Salary Caps in Europe
10 
3.1 Salary Caps in the Major Leagues 
A competitive imbalance, resulting in uninteresting games and skyrocketing player salaries, 
plays a dominant role in the list of dangers cited in all attempts to regulate professional team 
sports since the introduction of the first professional leagues in the USA. Throughout their 
history, American professional team sports have employed a wide array of regulations to 
safeguard against this danger. Reserve clauses limiting the free agency of players, the reverse-
order  rookie  draft  and  revenue  sharing  arrangements  are  well-known  examples  in  this 
context.
11 Another  prominent  policy  tool  used  in  the  struggle  for  cost  control  and  the 
promotion of competitive balance is salary caps.
12 
In contrast to earlier regulations imposed by team owners on players, salary caps are now 
an integral part of the system of labor relations in the U.S. major leagues. The maximum (and 
sometimes minimum) amount of league revenue that should be devoted to player salaries is 
negotiated  between  the  players'  unions  and  the  team  owners  and  is  fixed  in  so-called 
                                                 
9 C.f. Sloane (1971), Cairns, Jennett, and Sloane (1986), Késenne (2000b, 2006), Zimbalist (2003), Fort and 
Quirk (2004) and Vrooman (2007). 
10 This section is based on Dietl, Franck, Lang and Rathke (2009). 
11 For contributions that analyze the effect of revenue-sharing arrangements, see, e.g., Fort and Quirk (1995), 
Vrooman (1995), Szymanski and Késenne (2004), Dietl and Lang (2008), Dietl, Lang and Werner (2009) and 
Grossmann, Dietl and Lang (2010). 
12 C.f. Késenne (2000, 2003), Dietl, Lang and Rathke (2009, 2010) and Dietl, Franck, Lang and Rathke (2009) 
for theoretical analyses of salary caps.    9 
Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs).
13 Therefore, salary caps are not subject to anti-
trust actions in the way that earlier regulations affecting the player market used to be.  
Salary caps were unnecessary in the era of the reserve clause because players could not 
negotiate with another club without the permission of the current club, but this changed after 
the abolition of the reserve clause.
14 With the introduction of free agency into almost every 
professional sports league, “bidding wars” for the best players have been commonly observed. 
This  situation  led  to  an  explosion  in  player  salaries  and  gave  the  advantage  to  the  more 
affluent large-market clubs, which were able to poach talent away from their poor competitors. 
To limit the danger that all highly talented players would end up playing for rich clubs, which 
would deteriorate competitive balance, salary caps were instituted; they were viewed as a 
countermeasure against free agency.  
In  the  1984-85  season,  the  North  American  National  Basketball  Association  (NBA) 
became the first professional sports league to introduce a salary cap, allowing 53% of league 
revenues to be spent on player salaries. This translated into a maximum payroll of US$ 3.6 
million for each team. Today, the NBA's salary cap is a so-called "soft cap", meaning that 
there are several exceptions that allow teams to exceed the salary cap to sign players. These 
exceptions are mainly designed to enable teams to retain popular players. For the 2008-09 
season, the (soft) salary cap was fixed at US$ 58.7 million. At this time, all four American 
major  team  sports  leagues  have  some  variant  of  a  salary  cap  mechanism.  The  National 
Hockey League (NHL) operates with a salary cap system such that each team had to spend 
less than US$ 50.3 million on player salaries in the 2007-08 season. In the National Football 
League (NFL), the salary cap in 2008 was approximately US$ 116 million per team. Major 
League Baseball (MLB) claims not to have a salary cap so far. However, Major League 
Baseball  has  a  luxury  tax  mechanism  that  requires  the  definition  of  a  threshold  for  the 
application of the tax.
15  
3.2 Salary Caps in the European Leagues 
Though  European  club  football  has  achieved  a  level  of  economic  and  financial  potential 
comparable  to  that  of  the  U.S.  major  leagues  in  the  last  decade,  it  has  not  followed  the 
example of introducing salary cap mechanisms so far. Presumably, this reluctance is not due 
                                                 
13 Note that this kind of labor dispute entails strikes and lookouts, potentially resulting in the loss of part of or an 
entire season, as occurred in 2004-05 in the NHL (see Staudohar, 1988, 1990, 1997, 2005 for details).  
14 The reserve clause was introduced in baseball in 1887 and gave club owners an exclusive option to unilaterally 
renew the annual contracts of their players, binding them to their clubs until release, retirement or trade. As a 
result, a player could be tied to a club for the duration of his career by a series of annual renewals. The reserve 
clause was finally removed in favor of 'free agency' in 1976. 
15 For theoretical analyses of luxury taxes, see Marburger (1997) and Dietl, Lang and Werner (2010).    10 
to ignorance of the dangers of competitive imbalance and financial instability in European 
football.  Rather,  the  contrary  seems  to  be  the  case.  The  recently  published  Independent 
European Sports Review (Arnaut, 2006), an expert report based on a process of intensive 
consultation with the most important stakeholder groups in European football, leaves no doubt 
about the general perception that competitive balance in European club football is declining 
and  that  a  large  number  of  clubs  have  stumbled  into  massive  financial  crises  and  are 
accumulating ever-increasing debt.
16 
Examples of this financial crisis spreading throughout the European football leagues are 
numerous. In Spain's Primera Division, the total amount of debt in 2008 amounted to €3.2 
billion. Of the top 40 teams, 8 sought protection from creditors to stave off bankruptcy in the 
last two seasons. In particular, FC Valencia is seriously in debt, with €502 million. In England, 
the 20 Premier League clubs actually owe a total of €2.5 billion in bank overdrafts, loans and 
other borrowing; Manchester United and Chelsea are the most indebted clubs, each owing 
about €810 million (Deloitte and Touche, 2009). In Italy, the Serie A clubs accumulated total 
losses of €1.2 billion in the period from 1995/96 up to 2002/03, with 84% of these losses 
sustained during the period 2000/01-2002/03 (Deloitte and Touche, 2004, 2009). 
Among the reasons for European club football’s past failure to introduce a salary cap are 
the  organizational  differences  discussed  earlier.  Obviously,  the  labor  relations  approach 
employed  by  the  hermetic  American  major  leagues  is  not  feasible  within  the  European, 
association-governed football pyramid. Football associations cannot be compared with the 
team owners in an American major league, which represent the demand side of the respective 
labor market. Instead, associations are conceived of as democratic governing bodies that aim 
to integrate all important stakeholders of football in a certain geographic region, including the 
players and, of course, the representatives of amateur football. At the European level, the 
different political and market conditions of every football nation create additional stakeholder 
diversity. It follows that decision-making processes concerning the introduction of salary caps 
will  be  much  more  complicated  in  the  European,  association-governed  football  pyramid 
because the interests of various stakeholders need to be properly balanced.  
In  particular,  this  European  stakeholder  diversity  leads  to  the  following  specific 
characteristics.  First,  a  salary  cap  system  must  take  into  account  the  significant  market 
heterogeneity within the European football pyramid. The American system of an absolute 
capped salary amount for all clubs covered by the CBA will not work in the European football 
pyramid because, for example, a typical Belgian first division club will earn approximately 
                                                 
16 Owing to their structure, professional team sports carry the risks that clubs will over-invest in playing talent. 
See Dietl, Franck and Lang (2008b) for a formal analysis of this overinvestment problem.   11 
13%  of  the  revenues  of  the  typical  English  Premiership  club.  Because  the  cost  of 
administering a specific absolute cap for every league in the European football pyramid would 
be prohibitive, the only workable solution in the European context seems to be a percentage-
of-revenue cap. Unsurprisingly, all discussions among the stakeholders of European football 
focus on this relative capping strategy. 
Based  on  consultations  with  important  stakeholder  groups  in  European  football,  the 
Independent European Sports Review refers to the same relative capping strategy: 
"The  European  Professional  Football  Leagues  also  consider  that  a  salary  cost 
control  system  should  be  further  examined,  as  a  possible  tool  to  bring  both 
financial  stability  to  football  and  help  to  maintain  and  improve  competitive 
balance in the sport. [..] A common feature of cost control systems is to stipulate a 
given  percentage  of  club  revenues  which  may  be  spent  on  player  salaries." 
(Arnaut, 2006) 
Second, as already mentioned, the hermetic American major leagues operating independently 
of  association  structures  implemented  salary  caps  as  an  integral  part  of  a  labor  relations 
approach. The player's union and the owners represent the two sides of the relevant labor 
market, and the state accepts the outcome of their bargaining as written down in CBAs. This 
labor market model is not compatible with the European association model. Associations do 
not represent one side of a labor market. 
Instead, they are sports-governing bodies. Representing all of the important stakeholders 
in sports, they perform regulatory functions normally reserved for the state. For historical and 
cultural  reasons,  European  states  have  left  the  regulation  of  sports,  to  a  more  or  less 
substantial extent, to the sports governing bodies. This self-regulation of sports is seen as an 
important  expression  of  European  civil  society  (Arnaut,  2006).  However,  the  scope  for 
autonomous regulatory activity by the sports governing bodies is by no means unlimited. 
Recently, the application of EU law has introduced a dynamic in which the sports-governing 
bodies have found it increasingly difficult to judge whether they are acting in accordance with 
EU law. The Bosman ruling of the EU Court of Justice provides the most prominent example 
of a regulation that was issued by the football associations (the player transfer system) but 
was then found to violate EU law—in particular, the principle of freedom of movement in the 
labor market.
17 
                                                 
17 In its famous verdict, the European Court of Justice abolished the existing transfer system and the so-called 
3+2 Rule, which limited the number of foreign players that a club could field. For contributions analyzing the 
implications of the Bosman ruling, see, e.g., Simmons (1997), Feess and Muehlheusser (2003), Frick (2007, 
2009), Dietl, Franck and Lang (2008a), and Lang, Rathke and Runkel (2010).   12 
In this context, it is a priori unclear if a salary cap mechanism in European football falls 
under the margin of discretion granted by the state authorities to the sport associations as 
necessary for them to perform their duties. As the previous interference of EU institutions in 
the regulatory activities of sports associations shows, the football governing bodies will have 
to prove that their proposal of a salary control system is doing more than just, for example, 
improving the financial situation of clubs. It is well recognized that sound club financials play 
an important role in preventing incomplete seasons and maintaining the integrity of football. 
Clubs operating on the verge of bankruptcy are more inclined to engage in illegal practices, 
such as money laundering, match-fixing and tax fraud, which harm the image of the whole 
industry. However, the history of intervention shows that EU institutions will assess a salary 
control  system  from  a  much  broader  social  welfare  perspective,  a  perspective  that  is  not 
restricted to the improvement of financial stability alone but that, rather, simultaneously aims 
to secure the fair treatment of players and consumers.
18  
4. Conclusion 
The peculiarities of team sports industries imply that the production process involves two 
distinct steps. First, teams are assembled on the individual firm level; then, they are deployed 
in the production of a championship race. Maximizing sporting success, however, does not 
necessarily imply economic success. Indeed, an attractive championship can only be produced 
when enough potent contenders are available.  
In  addition,  because  championships  are  monopolies  by  definition,  team  owners  face  the 
problem of specific investments. Vertical integration, the remedy usually prescribed for this 
problem,  is  not  suitable  because  it  would  harm  the  perceived  integrity  of  the  sporting 
competition.  
The organizational innovation that can combat these problems is the formation of cooperative 
associations of team owners. Specific investments are protected by transferring control over 
the second stage of production to the team owners, keeping incentives to compete unharmed. 
While this form of cooperative organization has long been established in the North American 
major leagues, recent developments in the professional European leagues can be seen as a 
progressive move away from the prevalent contractual approach towards cooperative league 
governance.  Regardless  of  the  efforts  made  to  emulate  the  North  American  leagues,  the 
                                                 
18 Dietl, Franck, Lang, Rathke (2009) analyze the welfare implications of a percentage-of-revenue salary cap in a 
team sports league with win-maximizing clubs, a setup closely resembling the European one. They show that 
salary caps can be welfare-increasing. In any case, a salary cap allows the clubs to make a profit, which 
contributes to financial stability. Allowing for the possibility that the league governing body cares 
disproportionately about club surplus strengthens the case for the implementation of such caps.   13 
organizational structure of football leagues in Europe differs substantially from that of their 
North  American  counterparts  because  all  leagues  are  embedded  in  association  structures. 
Every  national  football  association  governs  a  system  of  leagues  that  is  open  through 
promotion and relegation. In addition, clubs are organized as members' clubs, implying win- 
rather than profit-maximizing behavior. 
Organizational differences have implications for the introduction of salary caps, a policy tool 
common in North American leagues. In the hermetic American major leagues, player's unions 
and owners represent the two sides of the relevant labor market, and salary caps are the 
outcome  of  collective  bargaining  agreements.  Although  the  problems  of  spiraling  player 
salaries and unhealthy competitive imbalance are well-known dangers in European football, 
the  wisdom  of  introducing  salary  caps  is  currently  being  debated.  The  decision-making 
processes  concerning  the  introduction  of  salary  caps  are  much  more  complicated  in  the 
European  association-governed  football  pyramid.  In  this  decision-making  process,  the 
significant  diversity  within  the  European  football  pyramid  has  to  be  taken  into  account, 
making a percentage-of-revenue cap perhaps more appropriate. Moreover, the closed U.S. 
labor market model is not applicable which begs the question: To what extent would the 
introduction of salary caps fall under the range of discretion granted to the sport associations 
by the national authorities, and would such an endeavor be in accordance with EU regulations? 
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